Growing inequality II

According to the left graphic of the figure in the yesterday post – Distribuzione della ricchezza netta nel periodo 1991-2010 –  the 10 percent of the Italian richest families holds the 45.6 percent of the aggregate net wealth. The right graphic shows also that the share of wealth owned by the 50 percent of the Italian less rich families is relatively stable (in the period 1991-2010), with a value fluctuating around 10%.
In term of income we may look at the following table
From this table, it is easily seen that the (less rich) 60 percent of Italian families obtains only 35 percent of total income. Because this 60% would be an absolute majority, a constituency favouring a greater income redistribution might materialize, easily win the polls and determin an appropriate policy making income distribution more balanced. Why this did never happen? Neither in Italy or in whichever country where income distribution shows a comparable pattern?
So, before asking what is a balanced or fair income distribution, one should try to answer this question: why democratic societies do not redistribute more?.
As an economist, I could answer appealing to the negative correlation between equality and efficiency. If decreasing inequality involves increasing inefficiency – the big tredeoff in the words of Arthur Okun – distorting microeconomic incentives (to work, save, innovate, etc.), through ridistributive policies that imply heavier taxation, may shrink the size of economic pie. If people recognize this, a plurality supporting greater income redistribution may not arise. This argument is controversial and in fact some economists (Stiglitz among others, see yesterday post) argue for the opposite, that is the inequality inefficient and is the inequality not the equality that reduces the economic pie. The (in)equality-efficiency divisive nexus reduces to a key parameter: the elasticity of work effort. If the elasticity is small, equality is efficient (or close to efficiency). But if work effort reacts substantially to incentives, the “big tradeoff” emerges: efficiency and equality are negatively correlated. In this case, the mythical benevolent social planner, targeting at optimal distribution, should attempt limited or no redistribution. Thus, this line of explanation ends in an empirical matter: how big is the elasticity of labor supply (the debate among economists about optimal taxation and (re)distribution turns around this uncertain parameter).
But, apart from these economic arguments, the fact is that most people have an innate sense that merit should be rewarded, that who works should be compensated for his effort and capacity. Moreover, some persons think that individual freedom and economic freedom go together and that greater ridistributive policies may interfere with individual tastes, preferences and choices, and thus are against these policies even if they belong to the 60 percent less rich of people.